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1.  Introduction 
The performance of the European labour markets improved significantly during the second half 
of the 1990s (AER 2003). After having reached a peak in 1994, the unemployment rate started 
gradually to decline while both the employment and the participation rates kept rising. With 
increases of more than 8 and 7 percentage points, respectively for the employment and the 
participation rates, the female and the older workers were the most dynamic components. These 
improvements reflect long-term changes in the socio-economic behaviour such as a different 
attitude toward female employment and participation, improved health and working conditions 
which induce to retire at older ages. Yet, they took place in response to the reforms implemented 
during the period (e.g. ECB, 2007). The last decade witnessed important changes in European 
pension systems. Up to 1995, only few countries implemented pension reforms. By 2006, almost 
every European country had enacted reforms of the pension system. This richness of reforms 
across countries and time of their occurrence can be used to conduct a "policy experiment" of 
the effects of pension reforms on the participation rates of people aged between 50 and 64 years. 
Each policy intervention is considered as a discrete event that occurred at a specific time for each 
country. The event-study compares the value of one variable of interest after a certain reform or 
legislation has taken place with its value before such change has occurred. To control for other 
determinants not related to specific policy interventions, the findings of before-after comparison 
are compared with a control group made of those countries which did not implement a reform at 
least in one year covered by the sample period. With the event-study approach we will verify 
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  3whether after pension reforms the participation rate rises.
1 Thus, we analyse the impact of 
pension reforms on participation rates of different age/sex groups of elderly workers by 
contrasting changes in participation rates in reforming vs non-refroming countries.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the main stylised facts. Section 3 briefly 
reviews the main theoretical explanations of the observed trends in participation, while section 4 
discusses the effects of pension reforms on the average retirement age. Section 5 gives an 
overview of the reforms undertaken in the EU between 1997 and 2007. Section 6 presents the 
empirical finding of the effects of recently introduced pension reforms on the older workers' 
activity rates. Section 7 discusses the policy implications and possible follow up. 
2.  Stylised facts: main developments in older workers' participation rates 
Life expectancy has significantly increased in developed countries, mainly thanks to improved 
living standards, working conditions and health care. In the early 1980s the average life 
expectancy stood at around 75 years to reach 80 in 2006; for few new Member States it hovered 
around the EU average of 26 years earlier. (Table 4).  
Work has become less physically demanding, population much healthier and long-lived. Even so, 
as documented, among others, by Palmer (1999), Samwick (2002), and Boeri et al (2001), there 
has been a significant decline in the participation rate of elderly people, which reversed its 
negative trend only in recent years. The dramatic difference in the time pattern across men and 
women (Graph 1) often gets unnoticed. For several countries, the activity rate of men aged 
between 55 and 64 appears often U shaped, with decline in participation at least until the mid 
1990s. For the 50-54 age group, rates appear more stable and the decline relatively more limited; 
there are significant exceptions to this pattern such as. the participation rates of Belgian and 
Italian men aged 50-54, rapidly converging to the highest rates. Despite country specific labour 
force histories, the broad trend of a shrinking labour supply of male aged 50+ remains. Thus, 
even though men live longer than before, they leave the labour market earlier. 
Conversely, women, especially those aged less then 60, have a steadily rising participation, and it 
is not rare to find countries where female rates almost doubled in 10 years only. The change over 
time in the age profile of the participation rates confirms that the major modifications in the 
participation behaviour occurred in the case of women, at age below 59, and especially in their 
early 50s. Without these modifications, several countries would have had in 2007 activity rates 
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  4hovering around the level of twenty years earlier. As a consequence of these differentiated 
patterns in the participation rates by sex, the average age at which people retire has changed only 
to a minor extent (Table 5). 
Graph 2 displays the age profile of the exit rate from the labour market for selected countries for 
the mid 80s, the early 1990s and the first half of 2000s. This rate is calculated as the conditional 
probability of an age cohort of not staying in the labour market at age h.
2 Spikes can be observed 
at about the statutory retirement age for all countries and, for some, at the age of early retirement. 
There is also a clear difference in the exit rates by sex which reflects different statutory retirement 
ages of men and women. Finally, there are recently significant changes in the age profile of the 
exit rates in the recent years. The probability of leaving the labour market at ages just below 60 
falls for both sexes in several countries. Even so, at the age of 60 there is a significant increase in 
the probability of withdrawing from the labour market. Early exit from the labour market 
remains high in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands.  
The patterns briefly described are the outcome of complex individual participation decisions 
which are influenced by a variety of factors, including social factors, such as longer schooling or 
change in the role of women in households; demographic factors, including the decline of fertility 
rates and modifications of the age structure; institutional factors, such as changes in the financial 
incentives to retire early, in the eligibility conditions or in the availability of alternative early 
retirement paths, (e.g. temporary access to disability and unemployment benefits before being 
granted retirement benefits, Van Ours, 2006 for the Netherlands). Early- or pre-retirement 
programmes were commonly used in the 70s and 80s to deal with industrial restructuring 
(Brugiavini, 2001), high unemployment of older workers, low employment of young workers, or 
as a labour cost saving strategies. Economic factors, such as the level of the unemployment rate, 
the average income by household, the share of part-time employment in total employment or the 
share of the services sector in the economy have also been invoked to explain the differences in 
the participation rates across countries and over time.   
3.  What explains the main trends  
Many economists have tried to solve the puzzle of higher life expectancy, less physically 
demanding work and lower retirement ages. Two major factors have caused declining 
participation rates of older workers (Diamond, 2005).  
                                                                                                                                                         
decisions and legislative reforms. 
2 In symbols if PR(h,t) is the participation rate at time t of cohort h, the exit rate is defined as 1-PR(h,t)/PR(h-1,t-1). 
  5First, due to positive trend in real earnings, both the fraction of lifetime spent working dropped. 
As the income effect from higher real earnings prevails on the substitution effect, higher real 
incomes allows more hours for leisure, higher consumption and savings despite falling working 
time. Thus, the increase in real wages has been the main determinant of the long-term decline in 
the retirement age in industrialised countries (Bloom, Canning and Moore, 2007).  
The increase in the lifespan has also produced a wealth effect because of the influence of 
compound interest and wage growth, which reduce the proportion of life devoted to work. 
Second, the rules establishing access to pension, public health and long-term care may have 
influenced the individual decision to retire. As life expectancy increases it would be optimal to 
postpone retirement age. However, the existence of social security programs translate into higher 
savings and earlier labour market exits (e.g. Bloom, Canning, Mansfield and Moore, 2006 for a 
life-cycle model of the labour supply with endogenous retirement age and the social security 
arrangement). Similarly, in a model with stochastic ageing among three age classes and 
accumulation of human capital with two skill levels, Ljiungqvist (2007) shows that the non-
employment effect of taxation do not differ in complete and incomplete markets, with the tax 
and benefit system affecting non-employment of low and high skilled respectively in complete 
and incomplete markets.
3 Using a panel for 12 countries, Gruber and Wise (2002) demonstrate 
several disincentives for continued work for the elderly built in national social security schemes. 
Many have noticed high exit rates at the first age at which one can retire and at the statutory 
retirement age (e.g. Coile and Gruber, 2000 or Samwick, 1998). More generally, individuals able 
to set aside enough funds are those that firstly retire, especially when they are allowed to use 
benefits to "top-off" their retirement wealth.  
Early retirement schemes can be characterised by several adverse mainly long-term effects 
(Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004). They can influence negatively the accumulation of human 
capital of less-skilled workers, lower economic growth, and increase the dependency ratio and the 
risks of financial imbalances when population ages. Using an overlapping generation model with 
heterogeneous agents extended by voting, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso demonstrate why alternative 
policies had not been realised even though they would have had less distortive impact upon the 
economy. Their analysis provides a political economy explanation of the early retirement 
schemes.  
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  64.  Pension reforms and average retirement age  
If expected income falls or life expectancy increases unexpectedly, a worker realises that his/her 
planning horizon is extended and previous plans concerning the rest of his/her life should be 
reassessed. Economic theory proposes three ways how to set up a new optimal plan. First, a 
worker could reduce consumption during pre-retirement age and accumulate savings for later 
stages of life. Second, a worker could reduce consumption spending during retirement age and 
deplete lifetime savings more slowly. Third, a worker could decide to work longer to reach the 
initial level of consumption. In addition, when there is only one earner in the family, the fall in his 
or her expected income during retirement may induce the second earner to enter into the labour 
market to keep unchanged the family consumption.
4 The final impact on the participation rate 
depends on how these effects influence the retirement decision.  
Within a life-cycle framework, the retirement decision is a function of the lifetime streams of 
earning, pensions and other sources of income (Mitchell and Fields 1981). Obviously rational 
agents chose their optimal consumption pattern jointly with the amount of work they wish to 
supply during their lifetime and the time at which they wish stop working. In a standard 
competitive model with social security, taxes and benefits have distortionary effects on individual 
consumption, savings and optimal retirement age (e.g. Seshinski, 1977). Thus, compared to an 
economy with no benefits, social security benefits imply in equilibrium lower consumption and 
lower retirement age. In the option value model (Stock and Wise, 1990), the work/retirement 
decision is associated to the option of continued work keeping the option to retire at a later stage. If the 
expected value of working is worth more than the expected value of retiring, the individual 
continues to work. If there are no expected gains from continued work, he would retire. In this 
framework, changes in the pension system such as changes in the coverage rate, in the accrual of 
retirement wealth attributable to continued work, more than the level of retirement wealth at a 
given point in time, are found to influence the average retirement age (Samwick, 1998).   
According to the simulations of Gruber and Wise (2002), a reform that delays benefit eligibility 
by three years would likely reduce the proportion of men aged between 56 to 65 out of the labour 
force between 23 to 36%.  
Mitchell and Fields (1983) apply an ordered logit model to estimate the impact on the average 
retirement age of changes in the expected income. Not surprisingly they find a negative impact of 
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  7a rise in social security streams on the average retirement age. The impact of a 10% increase in 
the social security benefits was estimated to reduce a retirement age by -0.07 years for all 
individuals without any restriction on age. In case of individuals at the age of 60 the effect is 
more pronounced when reducing the average retirement age by -0.19 years.  
Bottazzi, Jappelli and Padula (2006) estimate - separately for males and females - the impact of 
the Italian pension reform on the expected retirement age, omitting the transitional 1993-1997 
period of the reform. While their regressions indicate that the patterns found for women are the 
same as for men, still the effect on women is somewhat larger. The estimated impact on the 
expected retirement age is about 0.7 years for both male and female private sector worker. In case 
of public employee and self employed the effect is even higher reaching values over 1 and 2 years 
respectively. 
Some EU countries have switched from defined benefit to defined contribution pension systems 
or at least introduced one pension pillar based on this assumption. Such change may lead people 
to stay longer in the labour market and, therefore, is expected to increase the average retirement 
age. Friedberg and Webb (2005) support this hypothesis by estimating that employees with 
defined contribution plans usually retire one or two years later compared to employees with 
defined benefit plan. Furthermore, Diamond (2005) argues in favour of pension systems with low 
implicit tax on continued work after the age at which retirement benefits can first be claimed. 
Usually low implicit taxes are ensured with a defined contribution system.  
Palmer (1999) proposes a notional defined contribution pay-as-you-go system. As usual in 
prevailing pay-as-you-go systems, working people contribute to the system providing resources 
for contemporary pensioners. However, differently from the DB system, the more people 
contribute to system the higher is their future pension. Finally, the rate of return is not affected 
by the developments of the financial markets, but by the overall performance of the economy. 
So, the system should stimulate people to postpone their exit from the labour market and, in 
passing, to its financial stability.  
Bloom, Canning and Moore (2007) show that the optimal response to dealing with the solvency 
problems that arise in social security when life expectancy increases is to reduce contributions 
and increase benefit rates, maintaining solvency exclusively by increasing the retirement age. This 
response can maintain solvency because raising wages over time and compound interest on 
accumulated savings mean that longer working lives tend to create more than proportional wealth 
at retirement. 
  8The retirement age has stabilised and recently partially reversed its declining trend. Again, several 
factors have to be taken into account. First, under the pressure of ageing and the medium- to 
long-term risks for the financial sustainability of social security systems, several member states 
have enacted reforms of the pension systems that have tightened the eligibility conditions for 
pension benefits (e.g. minimum years of contributions, retirement age) and reduced their 
generosity. Second, some reforms have shifted part of the financial risks from state to employers 
and employees. Thus, longer life expectancy and less generous pension benefits may have 
induced workers to work longer to accumulate precautionary savings for their old age (i.e. they 
have made the income effect prevail over the substitution effect). The next section reviews more 
in depth the pension reforms enacted in the member states in the last decade.  
5.  Overview of early retirement and pension reforms undertaken in the EU over the 
1997-2007 period
5 
Reaching low levels of inactivity among older workers and promoting longer working lives are 
key factors to alleviate the negative impact of population ageing on employment and economic 
growth (European Commission-EPC 2009 Aging report). The 2001 Stockholm European 
Council stressed the importance of reforms encouraging higher employment and participation 
rates, especially among women and the elderly; it emphasised that pension reforms are needed to 
ensure both the long-term financial sustainability and a certain degree of intergenerational 
fairness.  
In response to pressures stemming from ageing populations and persisting low participation 
rates, all countries of the EU have reformed their pension systems. These reforms comprise a 
number of different measures (Table 6 and Table 7) that were meant to keep the sustainability of 
public finances mainly by transferring part of the demographic risk from the state to individuals 
and by giving strong incentives for working longer.  
A widely accepted distinction is between parametric and systemic reforms. Parametric are those 
reforms which involve adjustments to the parameters of defined benefit (DB) and pay-as-you-go 
                                                 
5 This section briefly describes the main elements of the reform strategies adopted in the EU27 over the period 
1997-2007. Information on pension reforms adopted in the EU27 in the years 2000 to 2007 is taken from the 
LABREF database (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8638_en.htm). For reforms 
enacted during the Nineties in the EU15, we used the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti database, available at: 
http://www.frdb.org. Concerning Bulgaria and Romania, for the time being LABREF only covers the years 2003 to 
2007. Missing information was mainly obtained from Disney, R. (2003), "Public Pension Reforms in Europe: 
Policies, Prospects and Evaluation", a number of ILO and ISSA papers, as well as the Joint Reports on Social 
Protection and Social Inclusion, 2007 and 2008 editions, and the Synthesis report on adequate and sustainable 
pensions 2006, all available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/index_en.htm. 
  9(PAYG) public pension systems, without changing their financing mechanisms. Systemic reforms 
move away from the PAYG DB- system and adopt a DC-type personalised accounts system - 
thus linking more strictly pension contributions to pension benefits.
6  
The majority of pension reforms adopted in last ten years were parametric, mainly strengthening 
the links between contributions and benefits (notably by extending the period over which 
earnings are taken into account for benefits’ calculation) and stricter conditions for eligibility to 
first pillar defined-benefit pension schemes (notably through higher retirement ages). For 
example, the reference contribution period and wages used for the calculation of old-age 
pensions were extended in Finland in 2003; the annual pension accrual rates were also modified 
to discourage early exits from the labour market and to financially reward long working careers; it 
was also decided that starting from 2009 pensions would begin to reflect changes in average life 
expectancy. 
7 In Finland and Sweden, greater flexibility was given to older workers to decide their 
retirement age (abolition of the general retirement age at 65). In Austria, the 2003 pension reform 
raised the retirement age to 65 for men (60 for women) starting from 2017, extended the 
assessment period for pension calculation gradually from 15 to 40 years and gradually reduced the 
accrual rate.
8 Finally, the reform of the public old age pension scheme introduced in Portugal in 
2000 increased to 40 years
 the contribution period for a full pension for the private sector
9. Other 
measures included changes in the taxation of contributions and benefits, or in the pension 
coverage, as well as the setting-up and development of mandatory and/or voluntary second- and 
third-tier pension schemes.  
Almost all countries increased the statutory retirement age, the majority opting for a smooth 
transition towards higher retirement ages (Table 8). The age of eligibility to a state pension was 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
6 The distinction between parametric and systemic reforms is largely used by the international academic community, 
notably the IMF and the OECD (see for instance "Pensions at glance", OECD, June 2007). The key parameters of 
DB pension schemes can be grouped into: income measures (ceiling or other restrictions on pensionable earnings; 
number of past salaries included in the calculation of the pension; revalorization mechanism for past salaries); 
eligibility conditions (statutory retirement age, minimum retirement age (for early retirement), minimum vesting 
period, contribution rate); benefit formula; (accrual rate; “reduction factors” for retirement prior or after the 
statutory retirement age;  maximum replacement rates and/or pensions; minimum replacement rates and/or 
pensions; indexation mechanism for pensions). The main difference between DB and DC pension schemes lies in 
the sharing of risks for longevity between the current generation and future ones - i.e. the shift to DC structure in 
systematic reforms implies greater risks for individuals.  
7 Germany, Finland and France introduced part-time work before the standard retirement age. In Sweden, 
individuals can continue working, taking a part-time pension and accrue additional unlimited pension rights. Gradual 
retirement was introduced in Luxembourg for the employees agreeing to switch from full-time to part-time work. 
8  One year later, the 2004 reform redesigned the calculation of pension benefits leading to a much stronger link 
between contributions and benefits, including a bonus/malus system for deferred/early retirement, and introduced a 
uniform pension law for all professions. 
  10progressively increased from 65 to 67 in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, in the latter with a very 
long phasing-in period. In the UK, the earliest age to take a pension was raised from 50 to 55 in 
2004 and a default retirement age was fixed at 65 in 2005, with unjustified retirement ages below 
65 years being prohibited. The retirement age was also progressively increased in the Czech 
Republic (2003) up to 63 years for men and childless women (women get one-year bonus per 
child varying between 59 and 62 years), in Hungary (1997) up to 62, Slovenia (1999) and Romania 
(2000). In Cyprus, the retirement age for civil servants was increased from 60 to 63, the same as 
in the private sector (where retirement ages range between 63 and 65). In Portugal it was raised 
from 60 to 65. The age at which women can receive a first pillar pension was equalised with 
men's age in most countries. 
Pension reforms involved a systemic change in the financing of the insurance system in few cases 
only, notably leading to the conversion of pre-existing DB first pillars into notional defined 
contribution (NDC) public pension schemes (e.g. PL, SE),
10 or to the introduction of statutory 
funded pension schemes (e.g. HU, EE, LV, SK). Some countries (HU, SE, PL, LV, EE, LT and 
SK) switched part of the public defined-benefit pension system into funded defined-contribution 
schemes, where the pension depends on contributions and interest earned on them. 
Systemic reforms were also introduced in countries that established state-supported second and 
third-pillar voluntary funded pension schemes, supplementing a gradual reduction of first-pillar 
pension levels (Germany in 2000) or promoted third pillar pension funds based on employees' 
own savings (France in 2003). Several countries encouraged supplementary pension schemes 
either through tax incentives or adjusting contribution rates in the direction of private and 
occupational schemes (e.g. HU, DE, NL) so as to promote the development of privately-
managed, fully-funded occupational pensions. Similarly, the automatic transfer of the end-of-
service allowance to occupational pension funds was decided in Italy in 2004. 
The changes introduced In several countries were rather incremental building upon previous 
reforms dating in some cases from the early Nineties (e.g. Italy). Reforms generally involved the 
establishment of stronger actuarial links between benefits and contributions - mainly through 
                                                                                                                                                         
9 In 2005, it was extended to employees in the public sector. The benefit formula was again significantly changed in 
2007. 
10 In Poland, pre-existing defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme was replaced in 1999 by a three pillar system 
including a notional defined-contribution (NDC) first pillar linking contributions to future pensions, a second pillar 
that capitalises individual contributions and is mandatory for the younger generations, and a voluntary third pillar 
based on company plans or other savings vehicles.10 Following the shift of the public pension pillar from defined 
benefit to notional defined-contribution accounts, the pension benefits depend on contributions made, but the 
notional interest rate is set by government and the schemes remain pay-as-you go financed. Similar reforms were 
passed also in Sweden (1999), Latvia (1996) and Italy (1993, with very long implementation schedule). 
  11longer contribution periods required for a full pension - and increased incentives for workers to 
retire later, notably by means of actuarial reductions for early pensions and increases in pension 
rights for deferred retirement.  
With few exceptions (e.g. Slovakia), the major reforms in the new Member States were legislated 
in the 1990s (for instance, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). In some EU10 
countries, recent reforms have increased the generosity of the system, for instance by introducing 
new early retirement schemes where they did not exist any more (e.g. in Lithuania, where the 
early retirement scheme was abolished in 1995 and re-introduced in 2004 for the long-term 
unemployed, the Czech Republic, where a new early-retirement programme in the steel industry 
was introduced in 2000) or by reinforcing them (e.g. in Hungary), to help absorb the shocks of 
ongoing employment restructuring and economic change.  
To take better account of future demographic changes, a significant number of countries 
introduced a demographic adjustment in their first pillar pension formula linking pensions to 
changes in average life expectancy. This is a common feature of all countries having introduced 
systemic reforms, where pensions will in future automatically adjust to changes in life expectancy, 
but similar adjustment mechanisms have also been built into systems which have not undergone 
systemic reforms (e.g. with the reforms of 2003 and 2004 in France and Germany. Similar 
provisions have been introduced in DK, FR, AT, FI, LV, LT and, more recently, in PT (2007).  
Discouraging early retirement... 
Early retirement benefits, which vary by country and usually by professional group depending on 
the nature of work, is the main reason for early exits from the labour market. They are often used 
as an instrument of employment policy, to artificially lower the unemployment rate of the elderly. 
Reducing the generosity of early retirement pensions was a key component of all pension reform. 
To discourage early exits from the labour force, Member States have abolished early retirement 
schemes, substantially reduced their generosity and introduced bonuses in case of postponement 
of retirement for those extending their working lives (Table 8). 
For example as part of the 1999 pension reform, in Poland the "pre-retirement allowance" was 
discontinued in 2001, while the eligibility conditions for obtaining "pre-retirement benefits" were 
made more stringent in 2004.
11 A comprehensive reform of the pre-retirement pension system 
                                                 
11 Both schemes had been introduced in 1994 to accompany employment restructuring in the waning branches and 
outdated sectors of national economy. 
  12was approved in France in 2003
12. In Finland (2003-2004), the qualifying age for early old age 
pension was raised to 62 and the individual early retirement, available to people with reduced 
working capacity aged 60 to 64, was phased-out. The early retirement pension for older long-term 
unemployed will be abolished in 2009
13. Some early retirement schemes were suspended and 
abrogated in Portugal in 2005
14 and the conditions for accessing early retirement tightened in 
Czech Republic and Spain (2006). Germany, Hungary, Slovakia (2006) and Portugal (2007) cut 
early retirement benefits, raised the minimum contributory period to be eligible for an old-age 
pension and tightened the access to schemes open to unemployed. In Latvia, the possibility to 
early retire was abolished in 2008. The early retirement age was gradually raised in Austria in 
2003, and the possibilities for early retirement will be phased out by 2017. In Germany (2004), 
the minimum entry age for early retirement on account of unemployment was increased from 60 
to 63. The earliest age at which a private or occupational pension can be taken was also raised in 
those countries where this has an impact on the effective labour market exit age (e.g. UK, IRL). 
In Sweden (2000), early retired people were allowed to return to work while the tax advantages 
for early retirement were abolished in the Netherlands.  
Working beyond the official retirement age was supported in many countries for instance with 
higher accrual factors – e.g. CZ, EE, LU, DE, EL, HU, PT, SI - or with the introduction of 
supplements for deferred public old-age pension (e.g. DK). Partial retirement was introduced in 
Germany (2001) and the UK (2004) and gradual retirement in France (2006). In this country, a 
new form of fixed-term contract for job seekers aged 57 or more was introduced in 2006, while 
the so-called 'Deladande Contribution' - a tax to be paid by companies dismissing employees 
aged 50 years and over - was gradually phased-out to improve the employability of older 
workers
15. Incentive schemes for workers who decide to remain in the labour market after the 
official retirement age were decided in Italy, France, Spain and the UK. 
                                                 
12 The 2003 reform, which was embedded in the pension package known as the 'Raffarin Act', included limiting fiscal 
incentives for pre-retirement schemes to physically demanding jobs and restructuring firms in financial distress; 
eliminating progressive early retirement; increasing the cost of company early-retirement schemes, placing 
restrictions on state-financed early retirement. Even so, employers may still require employees who have the right to 
a full pension to retire between the ages of 60 and 65 if the worker is covered by an early retirement scheme put in 
place before the reform came into force or if an extended sector-level collective agreement, providing for 
compensatory measures for such retirement, was reached before 1 January 2008. A number of sectors have taken 
advantage of this option for maintaining retirement before the age of 65. 
13 If people become unemployed at the age of 57, they will be entitled to the income-related daily unemployment 
allowance until the age of 65 if they have worked for five years during the previous 15. Those born before 1950 will 
be entitled to a daily unemployment allowance from the age of 55 until the age of 60; thereafter, early retirement and 
then full retirement will be still possible. 
14 Previously, workers in Portugal could qualify for early retirement benefits either at age 55 with 30 years of 
contributions or at age 58 if they were unemployed. 
15 The Deladande Contribution was introduced in 1987 to compensate for the removal of the administrative 
authorisation of redundancy but in practice obstructed the recruitment of people aged 50 years and older and 
  136.  An empirical evaluation of the effect of pension reforms on the older workers' 
participation rates in the short-term 
The OECD has conducted an extensive research on the impact of policies and institutions on 
employment and unemployment in the OECD countries.
16 This work showed that high implicit 
taxes on continued work deter older workers from remaining in the labour market, while high 
statutory retirement ages have the opposite effect.
17 The characteristics of the old age-age public 
pension systems (e.g. standard retirement age, accrual rates) and other forms of income support 
(early retirement schemes) are found as the main determinants of the differences in the 55-64 
participation rates across countries and over time (Blondall and Scarpetta, 1998; Duval, 2003).  
In this section we verify the impact of pension reforms on the participation rates of specific 
groups of older workers with a difference-in-difference approach. This approach requires the 
identification of a specific policy intervention against which one should compare the difference in 
outcomes before and after intervention for a treatment and a control group. A source of spatial 
and temporal policy variation in the reforms carried out is necessary to estimate this effect.  
We exploit the information available from LABREF and other sources (e.g. FRDB, MISSOC etc) 
to identify a chronology of reforms.
18 Reforms are classified in three categories. First, 
fundamental reforms are those systemic reforms that imply a change from defined benefits to 
notional defined contribution first pillar pension schemes or that transfer public pension savings 
partly to private funded schemes. To this category belong parametric reforms that entail a change 
in the eligibility conditions (e.g. statutory retirement age, years of contributions). These reforms 
are usually gradually phased in and imply long implementation lags. Second, measures that do not 
modify financing or eligibility conditions are deemed as non fundamental, namely those 
                                                                                                                                                         
transferred possible redundancies to employees who were soon to reach 50 years of age. The contribution will be 
phased out completely in 2010. 
16 Bassanini, A. and R. Duval (2006), "Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role of Policies 
and Institutions", OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 486, OECD Publishing 
17 A 10 percentage points cut in the implicit tax and a one-year increase in the standard retirement age are estimated 
to raise the employment rate of older workers by 1 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. 
18 LABREF provides information on reforms enacted in various years by the 27 Member States. It is an inventory of 
labour market reforms jointly managed by DG ECFIN and the Economic Policy Committee. It is conceived as a 
tool to provide comprehensive description of qualitative features of the reform process, including the design of 
enacted reforms, their scope and durability. To date, the database covers the years 2000-2006 for the EU27. 
Information for the year 2007 will be made available to the public in April 2008. The database can be freely 
accessed at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/labref_en.htm.  For a description of 
LABREF see European Economy Research Letter Vol. 1, issue 3 November 2007. As regards pension reforms 
LABREF provides information distinguishing policy measures in the area of Disability benefits, Early retirement 
schemes, Contributions , Coverage,  Eligibility conditions, Level and tax treatment of pension reforms. For the 
years 2000-2006, the chronology of pension reforms is taken from LABREF. For the previous years the 
information draws on different sources (e.g. EIRO, MISSOC, NATLEX).  
  14modifying the tax regime of contributions and pension benefits, indexation rules, or introducing 
second and/or third pension pillar gradually and on a voluntary basis. The third group gathers all 
measures implying phasing-out of early retirement schemes. 
Graph 3 displays the cumulated number of fundamental, non-fundamental pension and early 
retirement reforms for the period 1990-2006. Three things emerge. First, an increasing number of 
countries introduced reforms that changed the philosophy of the system (fundamental reforms). 
As of 2006 nearly every European country, especially of the EMU (Table 6), had reformed its 
pension system. Second, starting from 2000, non-fundamental reforms are more frequent than 
fundamental or early retirement reforms. Third, early retirement reforms rare in the 1990s 
became more frequent in the early 2000s.  
This rich variation in policies across countries and over time can be exploited to assess their 
effect on the older workers’ participation rates. Each measure is considered a discrete event 
which occurred at a specific point time for each country. The value of a variable of interest after 
certain legislation has taken place is compared to its value before such a change occurred. To 
control for factors unrelated to specific policy intervention, the before-after comparison is 
evaluated against the average of a control group.  
In the period under consideration almost all countries undertook a pension reform. The quasi-
natural experiment framework requires that pension reforms are a source of exogenous variation 
with respect to shocks to the participation rates. Consistently with the common belief (Peerson 
and Svenson), we assume that the main motivation for governments to undertake a pension 
reform is to achieve financial sustainability of social security rather than to offset trends in 
participation rates and in the retirement age.  
Our sample covers 27 countries over the period 1990-2006.
19 To define our treatment group we 
identify as reform year the year in which a reform is enacted. When reforms of the same type are 
passed in two consecutive years we treat them as a single event; the average participation rate is 
taken as representative of the participation rate at the time of the reform. Similarly, if there are at 
most two years between two years of reforms we treat them also as one event. Our control group 
is made out of the remaining periods. Within both groups we compute the average change in the 
participation rate. Finally, the average change in the participation rate of the treatment group is 
                                                 
19 Since data on participation rates from European LFS Statistics are not available for all years for all countries the 
panel is unbalanced.   
  15compared with average participation rate for the control group.  If a reform is successful, the 
difference between the participation rates of the two groups should differ from zero.  
One way to detect this is to compare the change in the participation rate 1, 2 and 3 years after a 
pension reform has been implemented with the change in the participation rate in all periods but 
those that followed a reform. The change in the participation is modelled as follows: 
t i t i t i v I PR , , , + = Δ α ; Iit equals 1 if country i enacts a reform in period t and zero otherwise. A 
similar expression holds for a country j with j≠i. The average change of the participation rate in 
reforming years relative to change of the participation rate in years of non reform can be written 















s j t i , ,
                                                
.  The reform in country i  is successful if α is 
statistically different from zero. We evaluate the effect of pension reforms comparing the average 
change in the participation rate after a pension reform with the average change of the 
participation rate over the sample period excluding those years where a reform occurred.
20  
For each target group, the first two columns of Table 1 to Table 3, report the average change in 
the participation rate over reforms and non-reforms years; the statistical significance of their 
difference appears in column 3
21. Table 1 suggests that compared to the non-reform years the 
participation rate of the 50-54 and 60-64 age groups rise significantly in the years near to the 
reform year. Conversely, no significant change is detected for the participation of those belonging 
to the 55-59 age group. While fundamental reforms do not have significant effect on the 
participation rates in the years just following the enactment of the reform, probably because of 
the gradual phasing-in (table 2), parametric reforms entail a change in the participation rate of 
those with age between 55 and 59. 
 
20 In contrast, we do not look at the effect on the participation rate of changes in one specific element of the system 
(i.e. contributions, eligibility conditions, retirement age, indexation formula, and the like). We leave this for future 
work. 
21 Since it may take some time for a pension reform to have visible effects on the participation rate, we calculated the 
average change in the participation rate over a period of 6 years following a pension reform. 
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Table 1 - Average annual change of the participation rate after EARLY RETIREMENT reforms' years and years 
where no reforms occur  
  No reforms’ years  Reforms’ years  z-test: same mean 
changes 
Participation rate 50-54  0.5  0.9  1.9 
Participation rate 55-59  0.7 0.9  0.6 
Participation rate 60-64  0.3 0.9  2.4 
Source: Authors calculations on LABREF database; the difference between the participation rates of the no-
reforms and reforms years is statistically different from zero at 5% of confidence when the value of the z-test 
is above 2  
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Table 2 - Average annual change of the participation rate after FUNDAMENTAL reforms' years and years where 
no reforms occur  
  No reforms’ years  Reforms’ years  z-test: same mean 
changes 
Participation rate 50-54  0.8  0.5  -1.4 
Participation rate 55-59  0.7 0.9  0.4 
Participation rate 60-64  0.3 0.6  1.1 
Source: Authors calculations on LABREF database; the difference between the participation rates of the no-
reforms and reforms years is statistically different from zero at 5% of confidence when the value of the z-test 
is above 2  
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Table 3 - Average annual change of the participation rate after NON-FUNDAMENTAL reforms' years and years 
where no reforms occur  
  No reforms’ years  Reforms’ years  z-test: same mean 
changes 
Participation rate 50-54  0.6  0.5  -0.4 
Participation rate 55-59  0.4 1.1  2.1 
Participation rate 60-64  0.2 0.5  1.2 
Source: Authors calculations on LABREF database; the difference between the participation rates of the no-
reforms and reforms years is statistically different from zero at 5% of confidence when the value of the z-test 
is above 2  
 
Source: Commission services. 
Graph 4 shows the time pattern of the participation rate around the reform event for the three 
reforms’ types and the three age groups. We consider only those reforms that are followed at 
least by one year; hence, measures taken in 2006 are excluded from the sample. Next, in order to 
select the reform years we treat two consecutive periods of reform as a one reform year. The 
same rule applies for years once there are at most two years between two years of reforms. 
Consequently, the participation rate in the selected years is calculated as a simple average in these 
years.  
  17The figure plots the average change in the participation rate compared with the year in which the 
reform occurred. Hence, each point represents the cumulated change up to and since the 
enactment of the reform. A successful reform implies a change in the slope in the years that 
follow. Before the pension reform, all groups have participation rates lower than or as big as the 
rate observed in the year when it is enacted. Then the participation rate increases, and after 3 
years it is on average 5 percentage points higher than at the year of enactment.  
Graph 4 shows the cumulated change of the participation rates before and after the enactment of 
early retirement, fundamental and non-fundamental reforms.
22 The following points are 
noticeable: 
•  The increase in the participation rate is mainly due to the female component, with 
increases dominated by a long-term trend.  
•  After early retirement reforms, the participation rate of women aged 55-59 slightly 
accelerates, while the profile of the men rate is more muted.  
•  The change in the participation rates of the oldest group barely differ by gender.  
•  The 50-59 male participation rate changes after early retirement reforms.  
•  Non-fundamental reforms modifies the 55-59 participation rate 
•  The profile of participation rates does not change when fundamental reforms are enacted, 
which is consistent with these reforms being usually gradually phased in.  
•  The profile of female participation rate does not change in response to any type of 
reform. Yet, we don’t consider this an evidence of their ineffectiveness as female 
participation is dominated by a long-term trend unrelated to reforms of social security.  
These findings are suggestive of a positive impact of early retirement reforms on the participation 
rate of specific groups of older workers.  The different response for the male and female rates is 
consistent with differences in the elasticity of the labour supply to the implicit tax rates and in the 
length of working careers and years of contribution to social security. Thus, tightening the access 
to early retirement would induce women to postpone retirement.  
                                                 
22 We consider only those reforms that are followed at least by one year; hence, measures taken in 2006 are excluded 
from the sample. In addition, when one reform is followed within four years by another reform of the same type, we 
consider in the calculation only the three years preceding and following the first reform. 
  18Of course, participation rates also change in response to the business cycle. In line with the 
cyclical ups and downs, those out of the labour force may be induced to starts searching actively 
for a job when they perceive that their employment chances have improved. Similarly, 
unemployed people may stop searching for a job when their employment prospects weaken and 
leave the labour force (the so-called discouraged worker effect). Thus, controlling for the state of 
the economy is necessary to identify the effects of pension reforms on the participation rate. 
Finally, the participation behaviour is influenced by changes in the socio-economic aptitudes 
towards work of the elderly, not necessarily related to governments' interventions. The fact that 
participation rates can be influenced by other factors invites shifting to multivariate analysis.  
Before proceeding with the analysis an important caveat is needed. Short-term changes in the 
participation following a pension reform, as the one considered in this paper, tell nothing about 
the lags needed for a reform to fully influence the retirement decision and the participation rate. 
Pension reforms, especially fundamental, are gradually phased-in and their impact may become 
visible only after some years, when an increasing number of cohorts born over successive years 
start to be under the new regime. Therefore, the expected gains of pension reforms cannot 
always be perceived immediately and their short-run effect is uncertain. Moreover, due to the 
gradual phase in, it is unlikely that the oldest generations would change their retirement 
behaviour because of the reform. In contrast, those aged between 50 and 54 are more likely to 
revise their inter-temporal consumption/leisure allocation. In general, when a reform is 
announced, agents may respond with “imperfect” foresight when two dimensions of uncertainty, 
namely the timing and the measures adopted to reform the system, prevail (Butler 1999).  Finally, 
early retirement and non-fundamental reforms may have shorter implementation lags, and their 
effects can be more visible in the short-term. However, delay between announcement and 
enactment creates in general the possibility for agents to reassess how the reform will affect their 
incentive to retire prior to the effective implementation of the new regime (Santoro, 2006).
23 
Thus, the effects of the reforms in the short-term are highly uncertain and depend on how 
different cohorts react to current or perspective changes in the rules of the social security system. 
For example, for those relatively far from the statutory retirement age, any change in their 
participation rate due to the reform would be induced by an announcement effect.  
                                                 
23 Santoro finds unintended announcements effect of the Italian pension reform of September 1992. Santoro, M., M.,  
(2006), “Early announcements of a public pension reform in Italy” CBO WP-1 
 
  19Econometric Methodology  
To capture the effect of reforms we estimate a reduced form regression for the participation rate  
it i it i it i it
it it it
i it it t i it
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where PR it is the participation rate for different age groups in country i at time t; αi and μt  are 
fixed effects for countries and years respectively, SEXi is a dummy equal to 1 for women and 0 
for men; ERit, FUNit and NONFUNit  are dummy variables taking the value 1 if a reform occurs 
in country s at time t and zero otherwise. γ, δ and η is the mean difference between countries 
that undertook a reform of one of the three types and those that didn't. In practice we compare 
the participation rate in countries enacting a pension reform in a given year with the participation 
rate in countries that did not enact a pension reform controlling for other (non-reforms factors) 
that may influence participation. The unemployment rate ust captures the cyclical components of 
unemployment while long-term changes are represented by country/gender specific trends. 
24 
The reference group in the equation is men. Thus αi represents the average (over time) activity 
rate of male in country i. Since a reform may imply different effects on the implicit tax rate and 
pension wealth of groups with different working histories, we expect a response that differs 
across age groups and gender. The interaction between SEX and the reforms dummies would 
capture this differential effect. Including interaction of this sort is also convenient when treated 
and control group are very similar and/or the treatment and the control group differ along other 
dimension of the data, in our case sex; it may also remove trends along these dimensions (Meyer, 
1995). To account for lagged effect of enacted reforms we introduced the reform dummies up to 
3 lags (i.e. 3 years).  
The use of fixed effects allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity possibly correlated with 
the policy dummies. This happens when the participation rates and the decision to undertake 
reforms of any type are correlated. Under these circumstances the fixed effect estimator is 
consistent and unbiased. In addition to a country specific unobserved component, there can be a 
  20common latent factor which influences both the participation rate and the reform dummy. This 
happens when exogenous trends in participation rates (e.g. increase in level of education or 
female participation) make a reform of the pension system more likely (for example, because 
there is stronger support for reforming the pension system when the participation rate is low 
rather than high). In this case the fixed effect estimator is inconsistent and inefficient (Coakley, 
Fuertes and Smith, 2004). Conversely, the two-way fixed effects provide consistent and efficient 
estimates. In our case, the inclusion of period dummies would absorb all the values of the 
coefficients of the reform dummy making them not significant. To avoid this we account for 
unobserved common factors with a time trend, which is equivalent to controlling for period 
effects when the coefficient of the trend variable is the same across countries.  
The introduction of lagged of the reform dummies control for possible correlation between these 
and the country specific effects. Finally, to control for the presence of common shocks hitting 
men and women in each country we correct standard errors using a robust covariance estimator 
according to the formula developed by Liang and Feger (1986)
25across groups. We estimate the 
equation controlling for fixed effects and for fixed and time dummies
26. 
Results 
Before commenting the results, a note of caution is needed for the relatively limited number of 
observations and reforms events. Moreover, it is worth reminding that our analysis focuses only 
on the short-term impact of pension reforms, while in many countries these reforms are phased 
in only gradually.  
The results highlight a different response of the participation rate across gender, age and country 
groupings (table 6). Columns 1 and 2 show, respectively for the EU27 and the EMU, the 
                                                                                                                                                         
24 We tried specifications with different combinations of common and country specific trends. In light of the strong 
institutional characteristics of European labour markets we preferred to include country and gender/ specific trends 
Results are available from the authors.  
25 This is implemented in Stata with the cluster command. The clustering adjusts for correlations between the error 
terms over subgroups. In practice there are less independent observations standard errors should go up. If the error 
terms are not independent in a subgroup of observations (such as for the different time periods for a specific 
individual in a panel, or e.g. for observations that are spatially close) clustering avoids that common group errors 
generate too low standard errors (Moulton, 1990) 
 
26 Controlling for period fixed effects would imply that the estimated coefficients would capture all the effects of our 
reform dummies which are slowly time varying. Preliminary evidence based on ANOVA F-test suggests that for 
early retirement and non fundamental reforms there is more similarity in the number of reforms across time averages 
than across countries averages. The opposite occurs for the number of fundamental reforms with an average which 
is more similar across time than countries. This implies that the former types of reforms are enacted in a specific 
cluster of countries uniformly over time. Conversely the latter are enacted in specific years in a large set of member 
states  
  21estimates of the effects of pension reforms pooling data over the age dimension. The results for 
the full sample show an increase in the EU27 participation rate following a fundamental reform, 
though the coefficients are not statistically significant. Similar results are obtained for the male 
rate when estimates are limited to EMU countries; conversely, the effect on women is negatively 
signed, though statistically insignificant. In the case of non-fundamental reforms we have similar 
results for the EU27, i.e. positive but insignificant. In contrast, the estimates for the EMU 
countries suggest that non-fundamental reforms increase the overall male rate, while the effect on 
female participation is ambiguous. Finally, reforms tightening the access to early retirement 
increase female participation, more in the EMU than in the non-EMU countries. Conversely, 
their effect on male participation is in EMU and non-EMU countries negative or insignificant.  
Columns 3 to 7 display the outcome for three age groups. For early retirement reforms, we find a 
consistent pattern across different age groups of women. Reforms tightening the generosity of 
the early retirement schemes tend to increase the female participation rates, with statistically 
significant coefficients, especially for the ages close to the statutory retirement (55-59).
27 By 
contrast, the participation rate of men aged 50 to 59 is negatively affected by these reforms. Only 
in the case of men belonging to the 60-64 age bracket of the EMU sample, participation increases 
after early retirement reforms. In case of reforms that change the main financing characteristics 
of the pension system (fundamental reforms), we found a short-term negative impact on female 
participation rates in particular for the 55-59 and 60-64 age groups. In the case of men, the 
estimates suggest a positive response, in particular for those belonging to the 55-59 bracket. 
Those reforms that we have dubbed as non-fundamentals appear to be effective in raising the 
participation rate of men both in the EMU and non-EMU, though the coefficients are significant 
only for the EMU sample. On the contrary, women participation seems to fall in the short-term. 
However, the uncertainty associated to these results is higher probably due to “non-fundamental 
reforms” category being a residual gathering a range of diverse measures. Thus, the implicit 
assumption that these different measures have the same impact on the participation rate might 
not be valid. Finally, the impact of the early retirement reforms on women is in absolute terms 
always the largest. While for men, fundamental reforms seem to have the largest effect on the 
participation rate for the central age bracket. 
One problem with these estimates is that shocks to the participation rate might also hit the 
variable used to capture its cyclical component, i.e. the unemployment rate, implying that the 
coefficients measuring its impact on participation are biased downward - as the correlation 
                                                 
27 The impact is larger in the EMU sample.  
  22between the shock and the unemployment rate is negative - and inconsistent. To correct for this 
endogeneity, the equation has been re-estimated with instrumental variables using the own lagged 
values of the unemployment rate as instruments (table 7). As expected, the IV estimates of the 
coefficients of the unemployment rate are lower than the OLS estimates. Different specifications 
across countries and age groups suggest that the participation rate is broadly more sensitive to the 
unemployment in non-EMU countries. One exception is the participation rate of the group 50-
54, which has a response to the difficulty of finding a job due to the cyclical conditions as big as 
in the rest of the EU. 
Turning to the role of reforms, the IV estimation suggests for both the EU27 and the EMU 
sample, a statistically significant and positive effect of fundamental reforms on the overall male 
and female participation rates (col 1). When the focus is on specific age groups the effect on the 
male and female participation rates are respectively positive and negative. For the EU27 sample, 
non-fundamental reforms have usually a positive effect on participation rate, which is, however, 
precisely estimated only in the case of women. Conversely, for the EMU countries non-
fundamental reforms increase the male participation rate but decrease that of women of age 
between 55 and 59. Finally, reforms of early retirement reduce the participation rate of men, 
especially those aged between 50 and 54, but increase sizeably that of women.   
To account for persistent trends in participation rates unrelated to pension reforms, we include 
gender and country specific time trends in table 8. Adding trends usually turns out in a lower 
impact of reforms, implying that in the specification without trend the impact of reforms is 
biased upward, as part of these trends get caught in the reform dummies. Moreover, the fact the 
standard error of the coefficients measuring the impact of reforms remained unchanged suggests 
that the introduction of specific trends does not introduce multicollinearity that reduces the 
precision of the estimates.  
Thus, when we control for gender and country specific trends, we find that  
•  fundamental reforms increase the participation rate of older men, respectively in the EU 
and the EMU sample, by about 2/3 of and ½ percentage point within 2 years. For both 
samples, the response of the male participation rate to fundamental reforms conditioned 
to age is hump-shaped: low for the youngest and the oldest of the older workers age 
group and high for those with age at about the average retirement age; participation rates 
of men aged between 55 and 59 raise by about 2pp. Conversely, female participation 
  23declines in the short-term, more in EMU than in non-EMU countries, offsetting the 
overall effect of fundamental reforms.  
•  For the EU sample, non-fundamental increase the overall female participation rate 
(+0.7pp in the year of reform), especially of women aged between 50 and 54, while the 
male rates remain mainly unaffected. The opposite is found when the estimates are 
restricted to the EU subsample. In this case, the male rate increase – again the 50-54 age 
group being the more reactive – while the female components remain mainly unchanged 
with the exception of women of age between 55 and 59 whose participation rate drops by 
more than 2.5pp.  
•  Early retirement reforms have a positive effect on the female participation rate, especially 
for the 55-59 age group of the EMU sample. Conversely, in respectively the EU and the 
EMU samples, the male participation rate drops or remains mainly unchanged. 
7.   Conclusion and policy implication   
This paper investigates the short-term effects of pension reforms on the participation rates of 
specific age groups belonging to the 50-64 age class with a diff-in-diff approach. Variation across 
countries and time in pension reforms enacted in the member states provides the information 
needed to examine the effects of these reforms.  
The descriptive and preliminary econometric analysis conducted on a sample of 27 EU countries 
suggests a different short-term impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of men and 
women. Reforms tightening the access to early retirement have a short-term positive effect on 
the female participation rate, but reduce somewhat male participation. In our view, these findings 
reflect the different length of working life of men and women. A full pension is usually granted 
to anyone who has been working for a certain number of years. If someone does not reach the 
statutory number of working years, his or her pension is consequently reduced. When men enter 
the labour market, they tend to have more stable career path than women and to work 
continuously until retirement age (e.g. Hall, 1982). By the official retirement age, males have 
worked a sufficient numbers of years to get a full pension. As long as the pension reform reduces 
the expected lifetime income, it creates an incentive for those that have accumulated enough 
financial wealth to retire earlier. Thus, the optimal retirement age is defined as the upper 
threshold such that is never optimal to retire after that age as lifetime income is downward 
sloping (B.Jc.Heijdra and Romp, W.E., 2007). Following the announcement of a reform that 
  24makes less generous the pension system, men just below the retirement age may find more 
convenient to anticipate the exit decision, not to miss a generous pension. These findings suggest 
the risk of a run on pension funds well before the changes take effect. This has been indeed the 
case following the announcements of restrictions of early retirement in some EU Member States, 
according to the 2009 Commission working document “Joint Report on Social Protection and 
Social inclusion”. 
Conversely, women have more career interruptions than men, especially because of maternity 
leave and family reasons, and the number of years spent working at the age of retirement is 
smaller than men. This difference may explain why the female participation rate raises in 
response to early retirement reforms. Compared to men, women have to reach a reasonable 
pension or accumulate a sufficient amount of precautionary savings before being able to retire 
with (not too large) drop in consumption. The effects are stronger in the EMU than in the non-
EMU countries.  
The results for non-fundamental reforms are more uncertain. The positive effect of non-
fundamental reforms for men is not surprising. These reforms usually adjust upwards the 
contribution rates, implying a lower net wage. If the substitution effect prevails, an individual 
prefers to work more. There is an additional motive for working more, which is related to the 
increasing life expectancy. Because of a longer life span an individual needs to work more in 
order to accumulate sufficient amount of wealth. As the real wage drops, he/ she needs to work 
more to reach an intended level of consumption during the retirement age.  
In contrast, reforms that change the way of financing pensions or the eligibility conditions 
(fundamental reforms), usually with long phasing-in periods, may have unintended short-run 
effect on the female participation rate, especially of EMU countries.  
Our findings point at the importance of designing pension reforms and strategies to reform social 
security that reduce the risks of undesired effects on the decision to remain into the labour 
market. There is plenty of evidence that workers' information about pension rules and 
uncertainties about long transition periods may influence in the short-term the retirement 
decision in a way which is not consistent with the intended effects of the reform. While transitory 
periods may be needed to gain the political support for the reforms, long and reiterated 
discussions on how to reform the social security system may add uncertainty and, if allowed by 
the rule in force, lead to anticipate the retirement decision even in cases where reforms involve 
future and not current older workers. Well-informed individuals are far more responsive to 
  25pension incentives, while ill-informed individuals seem to respond systematically to their 
misperceptions of pension incentives (Chan and Huff Stevens, 2008).  
To buttress these results, we plan to extend the empirical analysis in five directions. First, in the 
regression, we control for the determinants of participation unrelated to reforms with country 
fixed effects, period dummies or a common trend. The evidence found needs to be corroborated 
by enlarging the set of controls to observable variables, such as self-employed, age of entry into 
the labour market, per capita income, share of employee working in the public sector. Second, to 
get an indication of the short-term effect of pension reforms on the retirement decision our 
result should be validated by similar finding for probability of withdrawing from the labour 
market. Third, to better study labour force dynamics in response to pension reforms we need to 
combine the cross-country policy variation with individual information on the labour market 
status. To use individual data from older workers' self-reported satisfaction to investigate the 
effect of pension reforms on their retirement decisions. Finally, in the estimate we do not take 
into account that for the retirement decision what matters is not the individual income but the 
family income. There is evidence for the US of a differential response to policy changes of men 
from one earner vs two earner households (Gustman, A. and Steinmeier, T, 2008). Extending the 
analysis to the participation rates of married men and women might provide some hindsight on 
the different, and sometime puzzling, response of the male and female participation rates to 
pension that found in our estimates.  
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 Table 4 - Life expectancy at birth 
 
 Belgium  Bulgaria  Czech  Denmark  Germany Estonia Ireland Greece Spain  France Italy 
1980 73.3  71.1 70.4 74.7
1 73.1  70.6 
2 73.3
 3 75.3  75.4  :  75.6 
 
1990 76.2  71.2 71.5  74.9  75.4  69.9 74.8 77.1  77  77 77.2 





4 1985;  
 
  Cyprus Latvia Lith.  Luxem.   Hungary Malta Netherl. Austria Poland Portugal  Romania 
1980 :  :  70.5  74.7 
5    69.1 70.4  76.5
 7  72.7 :  71.5  69.2 
1990 :  :  71.5  75.7 69.4  77
 6  77.1 75.8  :  74.1  69.9 
2006 80.6 70.9  71.1 79.4  73.5 79.5  80  80.1 75.3  78.9  72.6 
5  1986 ; 
6 1994 ; 
7 1985  
 
 Slovenia  Slovakia  Finland  Sweden  UK 
1980 :  70.4 74.5
 8 75.8  : 
1990 73.9  71.1  75.1  77.6  : 
2006 78.3  74.4  79.6  81  : 
8 1985          
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Table 5 - Average exit age 
 
 1984-1990  1991-1999  2000-2006 
BE  58.5 59.6  60.2 
DK  65.6 64.6  65.8 
DE
1  61.5 60.8  62.7 
GR  62.7 63.4  63.2 
ES  63.2 62.3  63.3 
FR  59.6 59.3  59.8 
IE  63.9 64.7  66.3 
IT  60.7 59.8  61.1 
LU  62.3 58.9  60.8 
NL  60.3 60.7  63.2 
AT
 2   58.3  61.4 
PT  65.1 66.2  64.5 
FI 
2   62.5  62.9 
SE 
2   65.4  65.7 
UK   62.3  64.3 
CY     67.9 
CZ 
3   59.4  61.2 
EE 
3   65.8  67.6 
HU 
4   58.1  61.1 
LT 
5   65.2  63.8 
LV 
5   61.4  67.1 
MT     60.1 
PL 
3   59.6  58.7 
SK
 5   57.4  59.1 
SI 
4   61.1  62.7 
BG     63.5 
RO 
6   61.5  62.5 
Source: Commission services.1 1985-1989; 2 1996-1999; 3 1998; 
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Table 6 – Number of pension reforms by a type of a reform and by a 
country group  
 
 Fundamental Non  Fundamental Early 
EU27 56  87  37 
EMU 36  55  26 
Non EMU  20  32  11 
 






























BE       x    x 
DK x      x    x 
DE x      x  x  x 
GR           x 
ES       x  x  x 
FR x      x  x   
IE       x     
IT   x    x  x  x 
LU            
NL           x 
AT x      x    x 
PT x      x  x   
FI x      x     
SE x  x  x  x     
UK x      x    x 
BG x          x 
CY x           
CZ x      x    x 
EE     x       
HU x    x  x    x 
LT x    x       
LV   x  x  x     
MT           x 
PL   x  x  x     
RO x          x 
SI x           
SK x    x  x    x 





 Table 8 –  
 
  Standard retirement age  Earliest age to access old-age pension 




BE  Men: 65 
Women: 64 
Women: 65  2009  60 (with minimum 35 years career) 
DK 
Social Pension: 65 (67 for those 
who had reached the age of 60 on 
1.7.1999) 
Supplementary pension (ATP): 67 
1) Increase of the eligible age for pensions from 65 to 67 
2) Increase of the eligible age for the voluntary early 
retirement scheme from 60 to 62 
1) 2024-2027 
2) 2019-2022  Supplementary pension (ATP): Persons who reach the age of 60 after 1st 
July 1999 can retire between 65 and 67 
DE  65 
67, starting with those born in 1947. For all those born 
after 1964, the standard retirement age of 67 years shall 
apply. It will still be possible retire at the age of 65 years 
without pension reduction if minimum 45 years of 
compulsory contributions from employment and care and 
from child-raising periods up to the age of 10 of the child. 
2012 to 2029 
 
 
The age limit of 60 years
28 will be increased in monthly intervals as of 
2006. From December 2008 the earliest possible age at which a pension 
can be claimed will be 63 
Under certain circumstances, people will be able to retire after 2029 from 
the age of 63 but will then have to face a permanent cut in the pension of 
0.3% per month of earlier retirement. Long-term unemployed will be 
obliged to take this early retirement option. The retirement age for 
disabled people will increase accordingly from the age of 63 to 65 years. 
GR 
Persons insured before 1.1.1993: 
Men: 65 
Women: 60  
 
Persons insured since 1.1.1993: 
Men: 65  
Women: 65 
  
Persons insured before 1.1.1993: 
Full pension: no age condition if 37 insurance years;  from between 55 and 62 
years for men (57 for women) depending on number of insurance years or 
working days eventually plus other conditions (e.g. mothers with a minor child, 
arduous and unhealthy work) 
Reduced pension: From 65 years (men and women) if 3,500 insurance days 
(transitory regulation until 31.12.2008), 
• from 53 to 60 years for men (55 years for 
women) depending on number of insurance years or working days plus other 
if relevant other conditions (e.g. arduous or unhealthy conditions, mothers with 
a minor or disabled child) 
 
Persons insured since 1.1.1993: 
Full pension: no age condition if 37 insurance 
years or 11,100 days; from 60 years for men and women if arduous or 
unhealthy work if 15 years of insurance or 4,500 working days; from 55 years 
for mothers with a minor or disabled child if 20 years of insurance 
or 6,000 working days 
Reduced pension: 
From between 55 and 60 years (men and women) if 35-15 
insurance years or 10,500-4,500 days insured 
                                                 
28 63 (or 60 for severely handicapped persons) after 35 years of pension insurance periods; 60 for women born before 1952 after at least 15 years of insurance, if compulsory 
contributions were paid for more than ten years since the age of 40; 60 for persons born before 1952 after at least 15 years of insurance if they were compulsorily insured for at least 
8 in the last 10 years, are unemployed at the commencement of the pension and were unemployed for 52 weeks after completion of the age of 58.5 years or have worked part-time 
for elder workers for 24 calendar months. 
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ES  65    
60 for those insured according to the system abolished on 1/1/1967); 61 
for employees with more than 6 years of service in the company and 
more than 30 years of contributions. 
The age of 65 can be reduced for certain groups whose professional 
activity is arduous, toxic, dangerous or unhealthy 
FR 
General scheme for employees: 
60. Complementary schemes for 
employees (ARRCO) and 
management staff (AGIRC): 65, 
with possibility to obtain the 
pension at the age of 60 if the 
basic pension was accorded at a 
full rate. 
  
56 for those that started their professional activity at the age of 14 
depending on the duration of insurance and contributions 
55 for the insured with severe disability who fulfils the minimum periods 
of insurance and contribution 
55 for the complementary schemes for employees (ARRCO) and 
management staff (AGIRC) 
IE 
State Pension (Transition): 
65 years. 
State Pension (Contributory): 
66 years. 
   No early pension 
IT 
Persons insured before 1.1.1996: 
Men: 65 ; Women: 60  
Persons with a disability of at least 
80% and blind people: Men: 60; 
Women: 55. 
Persons insured since 1.1.1996: 
Flexible retirement age between 
57 and 65 years. 
   
As of 2008, 60 years of age with no less than 35 years of contributions in 
the case of employees, and 61 for the self-employed; the age limit is to 
rise by one year from 2010 and by an additional year from 2014, thus 
reaching 62 and 63 years for the employees and the self-employed, 
respectively. A further postponement of pension payments is envisaged 
with respect to the moment in which the requirements are met, there 
including workers under the contribution-based system. For the period 
2008-2015, the possibility to receive a "seniority pension" under the 
requirements of previous legislation (at least 35 years of contributions 
and a minimum age of 57 for the employees and 58 for the self-
employed) is provided only to women who choose a pension treatment 
calculated according to the contribution-based method. 
Early retirement possible up to 5 years before normal retiring age for 
employees of companies in economic difficulties (pre-pensionamento) 
Special conditions for employees with early start of working life; 
employees exposed to arduous work; persons benefiting from specific 
measures to return to the labour market because of a shut-down or 
reorganisation of the enterprise; and manual workers 
LU  65      Between 57 and 60 on condition that 480 months of effective insurance 
or assimilated periods can be proved 





Progressive increase of retirement age to 65 for women  
Elimination of early retirement by 2017 
Between 2024 
and 2033 
62 for both men and women 
60 years for heavy workers provided that they have worked heavily at 
least 10 years during the preceding 20 years, and have a total of 45 
insurance years 
Gradual increase of these age limits between 2004 and 2014 (gradual 
abolition of these types of early pension) plus life coefficient for persons 
having completed the age of 50 on 1/1/2005 and younger persons 
Two more types of early pension for those having an extremely long 
insurance career or particularly hard working conditions 
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PT  65    
Unemployed: 62 if they were aged 57 at the beginning of their 
unemployment and have completed the qualifying period; 57 for those 
who have contributed 22 calendar years and are aged 52 or more when 
unemployed (with reduced pension); 55 in case of heavy or unhealthy 
work 
FI 
National pension: 65  
Statutory earnings-related 
pension:  between 63 to 68 
Lower individual retirement ages 
in the public sector 
  
62 
Statutory earnings-related pension: permanent reduction in the early old-
age pension by 0.6% for each month that the pension is taken early 
National pension: is similarly permanent reduction by 0.4% 
SE  Flexible retirement age from 61 to 
67 
   No early pension 
UK  State Pension:  
Men: 65; Women: 60 
Women: 65  2010 to 2020  No early State Pension 
BG 
First Pillar: Men: 63 plus 100 
points; Women: 59 plus 93 points 
If a person has insufficient points 
the right to a pension shall be 
acquired after 15 years of 
insurance and 65 years of age for 
men and women 
Second Pillar: 5 years before 
completion of pensionable age 
provided the amount saved in 
pensioner's individual account is 
sufficient to provide a benefit 
equal to the minimum pension 
The age and number of points for women are increased 
each calendar year by 6 months and 1 point until they 
reach 60 years and 94 points 
 
2009 
1) 47-52 for women and 52-57 for men plus minimum insurance period in 
the frame of the general statutory scheme with universal coverage. This 
regime is in force until 2009 
2) Teachers pension fund 
3) Supplementary compulsory pension insurance under the second pillar 
for early retirement of persons working under hard labour conditions 
CY 
65 for men and women; 
63 for miners    
63 for men and women, provided that the insured person satisfies the 
relevant contribution conditions and was entitled to invalidity pension 
immediately before reaching the age of 63 
58 for miners with at least 5 years of employment in a mine (1 month 
early for every period of f5 months of mining work) 
CZ 
Men: 61 years and 8 months. 
Women: no children 60 years, 1 
child 59 years, 2 children 58 
years, 3 or 4 children 57 years, 5 
or more children 56 years 
The retirement age shall be increased by 2 months for 
men and 4 months for women each year until it reaches 
63 years for men and women without children and 59 – 62 
years for women with children 
 
The pension is reduced by 0.9% for every 90 day period before normal 
retirement age. This reduction is permanent and continues after the 
recipient reaches normal retirement age 
 
 
 Standard retirement age    Earliest age to access old-age pension 





EE  Men: 63 
Women: 60   Women: 63  2016 
Early Retirement Pension: available up to 3 years before legal retirement age 
Old-age Pension Under Favourable Conditions: a) 5 years before standard 
pension age (after at least 15 years of contributions) for: raising a child with a 
disability for at least 8 years; raising 5 or more children for at least 8 years; 
those involved in the clean-up of the Chernobyl nuclear power station; those 
who have been unlawfully imprisoned or in exile for at least 5 years; b) 3 years 
before standard pension age for raising 4 children for at least 8 years; c) 1 
year earlier for raising 3 children for at least for 8 years; c) 5 or 10 years 
before the legal retirement age (and 15 to 25 years of contribution) for workers 
in occupations that are considered hard or hazardous  
Superannuated Pension: Early retirement available for certain professional 
groups (e.g. pilots, mariners) whose professional abilities have declined 
before the normal retirement age, provided they have 15-25 years of 
pensionable service depending on the profession 
2nd pillar: No early pension before retirement age 
HU  1st and 2nd pillar: 62    
1st pillar: Early Retirement Pension to those involved in jobs allowing 
exemption by age (i.e. work involving increased physical load or 
hazardous to health): 2 years before normal retirement age for those 
who have worked in such activities for at least 10 years (men) or 8 years 
(women); pensionable age is further reduced by 1 year for every 
additional period of 5 years (men) or 4 years (women). 
Advanced Pension: from the age of 60 for men and 5 years before the 
retirement age for women with long service period 
LT 
Men: 62.5  
Women: 60     
5 years maximum before retirement age, provided that beneficiaries 
have an insurance period of 30 years and have been are registered as 
unemployed for at least 12 months 
LV  Men: 62  
Women: 61 years by 1 July 2007 
Women: gradually increasing by 6 months every year until 
it reaches 62 
 
2 years before the standard retirement age men and women with an 
insurance period of not less than 30 years (preretirement pension - until 
1st July, 2008) 
MT 
For persons born before 1/1/1952: 
Men: 61; Women: 60 (women 
given the option to retire at 61) 
For persons born between 1952 
and 1955: 62  
For persons born between 1956 
and 1958: 63 
For persons born between 1959 
and 1961: 64 
For persons born on or after 
1/1/1962: 65 
  
For persons born before 1st January 
1952: No early pension. 
For persons born between 1952 to 1961: 61 if 35 years of paid/credited 
weekly social security contributions 
For persons born on or after 1
st January 1962: 61 if 40 years of 
paid/credited weekly social security contributions 
In all cases, those opting for early pension cannot be employed until 65 
of age 
PL 
Men: 65  
Women: 60  
 
  
55 for women with a 30-year qualifying period; 
5 years early pension for a) totally incapacitated persons if they fulfil the 
qualifying period requirements; b) persons working in unhealthy 
conditions or performing a specific type of work (e.g. journalist, rail 
workers) 
10 years early pension for miners, persons working with lead, cadmium 
or asbestos, steel workers, pilots, etc. 
15 years early pension for wind instrument musicians 
Persons born since 1.1.1949: No provisions 
  34   35 
RO  Men: 63 in 1
st quarter of 2007 
Women: 58 in 1
st quarter of 2007 
Men: 65  
Woman: 60  
2014 
 
1) Old-Age Pension with Reduced Standard Retirement Age: assortment 
of standard retirement age reductions for a) persons who contributed 
under special or difficult working conditions, b) persons who had a 
handicap prior to obtaining the insured person status, c) persons 
persecuted for political reasons, d) women with multiple births, e) other 
categories, defined by legislation. 
2) Early Retirement Pension: maximum 5 years before standard 
retirement age to insured persons exceeding the full contribution period 
by minimum 10 years 
3) Partial Early Retirement Pension: maximum 5 years before standard 
retirement age to insured persons exceeding the full contribution period 
by maximum 10 years 
SI 
Men: 63 in 2009 
Women: 61 in 2008 
(following gradual increase) 
  
No special early pension.  
Possibility of exceptions (no malus) in the case of retirement at the age 
of 58 provided that a person has completed 40 (men) or 38 (women) 
years of service 
SK  Old-Age Pension: 62 
This level of retirement age will be 
reached in 2014 for all population 
groups 
2014 
1st Pillar: No age limit. Early pension possible if minimum duration of 
membership (10 years) and minimum amount of benefit reached. 
2nd Pillar: No age limit. Early pension is possible if the early pension of 
the 1st pillar is received and minimum amount of benefit reached 
Source: MISSOC Comparative Tables on Social Protection in the 27 Member States of the European Union, in the European Economic Area and in Switzerland, Situation as of 1 January 2007, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/missoc_tables_en.htm#table2007; LABREF 2000-2007. Graph 1 – Male and Female age profiles for selected countries  
 















































































































































































  36Male and Female age profiles in selected countries 








































































































































































Graph 2 – Probabilities of exiting in selected countries 
 
 




























































































































































































  39Graph 3 – Count of Member States doing pension reforms 
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Fundamental Non Fundamental Early retirement
 
 
Source: Commission services. based on FRDB Social reforms data base and LABREF;  
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 Table 6  
Comparisom of the results between a group of all countries and EMU countries using a prefered spec
Variable (I) (I EMU) II (II EMU) III (III EMU) (IV) (IV EMU)
duf 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.0 1.0 1.3 0.2 -0.4
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 40 . 50 . 40 . 4
** *** ***
L.duf 0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.7 -0.1
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 50 . 6
*** ***
L2.duf 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.7 -0.1 0.4 0.9 0.7
0 . 30 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 50 . 50 . 60 . 6
** *** ***
L3.duf 0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.9 0.6
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 5
**
dunf 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 30 . 3
** **
L.dunf 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7 -0.1 -0.2
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 3
*** ** ***
L2.dunf 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 -0.1
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 40 . 50 . 40 . 3
L3.dunf 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.1
0 . 20 . 10 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 30 . 3
**
duer -0.4 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 0.9
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 30 . 3
** ** ** ***
L.duer -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 0.1 1.2
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 30 . 4
*** *** *** ***
L2.duer -0.2 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 0.3 1.2
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 30 . 4
** *** ***
L3.duer -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9 0.2 0.9
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 40 . 50 . 30 . 4
** *** **
duf_Women 0.1 -0.2 0.6 0.5 -1.2 -1.7 -0.9 0.0
0 . 30 . 40 . 30 . 40 . 70 . 80 . 50 . 6
*** ** ***
L.duf_Women 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.8 -1.4 -0.7
0 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 50 . 80 . 90 . 60 . 7
** **
L2.duf_Women 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.3 -0.5 -1.1 -0.6
0 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 90 . 90 . 70 . 8
L3.duf_Women 0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -1.2 -0.5
0 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 70 . 70 . 60 . 6
**
dunf_Women 0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.0
0 . 30 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 50 . 50 . 50 . 4
L.dunf_Women 0.1 -0.5 0.4 -0.2 -0.8 -1.6 -0.8 -0.6
0 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 70 . 60 . 60 . 5
*** **
L2.dunf_Women 0.2 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -1.1 -0.6 -0.2
0 . 40 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 80 . 60 . 60 . 5
***
L3.dunf_Women 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0
0 . 30 . 20 . 40 . 30 . 70 . 60 . 50 . 4
*** *** **
duer_Women 1.0 0.9 0.5 -0.4 1.3 2.1 1.6 0.4
0 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 50 . 80 . 50 . 4
*** *** ** *** ***
L.duer_Women 0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.4 0.7 1.5 0.8 0.5
0 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 80 . 50 . 5
*** ***
L2.duer_Women 1.4 1.6 1.2 0.2 2.6 3.2 1.4 1.2
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 60 . 90 . 50 . 6
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
L3.duer_Women 1.3 1.5 0.8 -0.6 3.1 2.7 1.0 0.5
0 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 71 . 00 . 50 . 7
*** *** ** *** *** ***
u -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
0 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 20 . 10 . 1
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
_cons 50.4 43.5 68.3 59.0 50.7 44.1 27.0 21.7
0 . 70 . 80 . 60 . 71 . 41 . 81 . 00 . 9
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Number of observations 9379.0 5929.0 3756.0 2376.0 2504.0 1584.0 3119.0 1969.0
Number of groups 810.0 480.0 324.0 192.0 216.0 128.0 270.0 160.0
adj R2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3  
  42Table 7 
UNEMPLOYMENT instrumented by UNEMPLOYMENT(t-1)
Variable (I) (I EMU) (II) (II EMU) (III) (III EMU) (IV) (IV EMU)
u -0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2
0 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 1
*** *** *** *** *** ***
duf 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 -0.5
0 . 20 . 30 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 40 . 4
** **
L.duf 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.3 -0.5
0 . 20 . 30 . 20 . 30 . 50 . 60 . 40 . 4
*
L2.duf 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.4
0 . 20 . 30 . 20 . 30 . 50 . 60 . 40 . 4
** * *
L3.duf 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.6 0.5
0 . 20 . 30 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 40 . 4
*
dunf 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 40 . 50 . 30 . 3
** *
L.dunf 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.7 -0.1 -0.2
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 30 . 4
*
L2.dunf 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.4 -0.2
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 30 . 4
L3.dunf 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.4 0.2
0 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 20 . 40 . 50 . 30 . 3
*
duer -0.4 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.8 0.8
0 . 20 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 50 . 50 . 40 . 4
* * ** **
L.duer -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.9
0 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 50 . 50 . 40 . 4
* **
L2.duer -0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 1.2
0 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 50 . 50 . 40 . 4
** ***
L3.duer -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 0.0 0.7
0 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 50 . 60 . 40 . 4
*
duf_Women -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -1.0 -1.7 -0.4 0.4
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 60 . 80 . 50 . 5
**
L.duf_Women -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -1.6 -0.4 0.3
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 60 . 80 . 50 . 6
**
L2.duf_Women -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.9 -0.6 0.0
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 60 . 80 . 50 . 6
L3.duf_Women 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 60 . 80 . 50 . 5
dunf_Women 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.8 -0.6 0.0
0 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 60 . 40 . 4
L.dunf_Women 0.1 -0.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 -1.7 -0.4 -0.3
0 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 70 . 40 . 5
** **
L2.dunf_Women 0.3 -0.1 0.6 -0.2 0.6 -1.1 -0.3 0.0
0 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 60 . 70 . 50 . 5
**
L3.dunf_Women 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.2
0 . 30 . 30 . 30 . 40 . 60 . 70 . 50 . 5
** *** *
duer_Women 0.6 0.2 0.4 -0.3 1.1 1.5 1.5 0.4
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 70 . 80 . 50 . 6
** * * ***
L.duer_Women 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.7 1.7 1.0 0.8
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 70 . 80 . 50 . 6
** *
L2.duer_Women 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.1 1.7 2.7 1.2 0.9
0 . 30 . 40 . 40 . 50 . 70 . 80 . 60 . 6
** * ** *** **
L3.duer_Women 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.6 1.6 2.3 1.0 0.6
0 . 40 . 40 . 40 . 50 . 70 . 80 . 60 . 6
** ***
_cons 47.8 41.0 67.6 59.1 48.1 44.9 25.8 20.8
0 . 50 . 50 . 40 . 60 . 91 . 10 . 70 . 7
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
N 8992 5782 3600 2316 2400 1544 2992 1922
N_g 810 480 324 192 216 128 270 160
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Table 8 
UNEMPLOYMENT instrumented by UNEMPLOYMENT(t-1 and t-2)
Variable (I) (I EMU) (II) (II EMU) (III) (III EMU) (IV) (IV EMU)
u -0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
*** *** *** *** *** ***
duf 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.1 0.2 -0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
*** **
L.duf 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.4 -0.4
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
*** * **
L2.duf 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.6
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
** **
L3.duf 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.7 0.6
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
** *
dunf 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
*
L.dunf 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.1 -0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
*
L2.dunf 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
L3.dunf 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
duer -0.4 0.1 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.7 0.8
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** * *
L.duer -0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.9
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** *** * **
L2.duer -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.9
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** * **
L3.duer -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.7
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
* *
duf_Women -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 -1.4 -1.8 -0.5 0.1
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
** **
L.duf_Women -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -0.6 0.1
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5
**
L2.duf_Women 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6
**
L3.duf_Women 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
dunf_Women -0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.2
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
L.dunf_Women -0.2 -0.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -1.6 -0.5 -0.4
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5
** **
L2.dunf_Women 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 -0.9 -0.2 0.0
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5
**
L3.dunf_Women 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.2 1.1 -0.1 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4
*** *** *
duer_Women 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.6
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
*** * ** *** ***
L.duer_Women 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.0 2.1 1.1 0.9
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5
** ** *** **
L2.duer_Women 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.7 2.5 3.6 1.7 1.6
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
L3.duer_Women 1.3 0.2 0.2 -0.5 1.7 2.4 1.0 0.6
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6
*** ** *** *
_cons 48.7 40.2 67.6 60.0 47.2 45.7 24.9 20.4
0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.7
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
N 8603 5633 3444 2256 2296 1504 2863 1873
N_g 810 480 324 192 216 128 270 160
* *
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